Air Force Institute of Technology

AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations

Student Graduate Works

3-2000

Space Range Scheduling and the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI)
Alan M. Matuszak

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Other Aerospace Engineering Commons

Recommended Citation
Matuszak, Alan M., "Space Range Scheduling and the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI)" (2000). Theses and
Dissertations. 4827.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/4827

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more
information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.

A

&
^
r

^

#
#

#

£
#

■ ki

1

'^ i■

-

.

►

.

#

#

SPACE RANGE SCHEDULING AND THE
LEAN AEROSPACE INITIATIVE
THESIS
Alan M. Matuszak, Second Lieutenant, USAF
AFIT/GSO/ENY/00M-02

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

^WALITYm&acSEBz

SPACE RANGE SCHEDULING
AND THE
LEAN AEROSPACE INITIATIVE
THESIS
Alan M. Matuszak
Second Lieutenant, USAF
AFIT/GSO/ENY/00M-02

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the
U.S. Government.

SPACE RANGE SCHEDULING
AND THE
LEAN AEROSPACE INITIATIVE

THESIS

Presented to the faculty of the Graduate School of Engineering and Management
of the Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Space Operations

Alan M. Matuszak, B.S.C.E.
Second Lieutenant, USAF
March, 2000

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

SPACE RANGE SCHEDULING
AND THE
LEAN AEROSPACE INITIATIVE
Alan M. Matuszak, B.S.C.E.
Second Lieutenant, USAF

Approved:
J /*7*^ 2^g>te>e>
Milton E. Franke, PhD
Thesis Advisor

Date

r^ÖOö
Ernest P. Smith, Lt Col, USAF
Committee Member

Date

Steven G. Tragesser,r,PhD
PhD
Committee Member

Date

Acknowledgements
There were a number of people and organizations that helped me in my research
and in putting this thesis together. I'd like to take this opportunity to thank a few of
them.
First of all, thanks to Captain Troy Endicott who helped introduce me to lean and
the Lean Aerospace Initiative, and who also served as my mentor during my first year at
AFIT and in the Air Force. His help was invaluable.
I'd like to thank Dr. Franke, my advisor for his help in the writing of this thesis
and guiding of my research. My thesis sponsor, Mr. Art Temmesfeld, at the Air Force
Research Laboratories was also instrumental in this research. He helped to champion my
research and facilitate the site visits that were essential in putting this thesis together.
Everyone that I spoke with regarding this research or requesting information was
very helpful. This cooperation and help was extremely important to me because of my
limited background in space range operations as I came on active duty. I'd especially
like to thank the members of the 30th Space Wing at Vandenberg, including the 30'
Range Squadron and Colonel Ed Bolton (who was the commander at the time of my
visit), and the 45th Space Wing at Cape Canaveral, including Captain Greg Karahalis.
The people at the Space and Missiles Center at Los Angeles AFB were also immensely
helpful with information and assistance to my efforts.
Alan M. Matuszak

Table of Contents
Page
1

Acknowledgements
Table of Contents

ü
v

List of Figures

vi

List of Tables

vu

List of Acronyms

1X

Abstract
1 Introduction

1-1

1.1 Purpose of Thesis

1-5

2 Lean, Launch Enterprise, and RSA

2-1

2.1 Right Place, Right Time, Right Price

2-1

2.1.1 What is "lean"?

2-2

2.1.2 Lean and Quality Initiatives

2-3

2.1.3 Lean Aerospace Initiative

2-4

2.1.3.1 Lean Aircraft Successes

2-6

2.1.3.2 Push Toward Space Applications

2-7

2.2 The Launch Enterprise

2-8

2.2.1 Why Examine The Whole Process

2-8

2.2.2 U.S. Space Launch Flow

2-9

2.3 The Advent of RSA

2-11

2.3.1 Need For Change

2-12

2.3.2 Development Falters

2-13

2.3.3 The Restructure Of Systems Command, Start Of RSA

2-14

2.3.4 RSA Today

2-15

2.3.5 Where Does Lean Fit In?

2-17

3 Launch Operations

3-1

3.1 Range Functions

3-1

11

3.2 Range Elements

3-2

3.3 Space Launch Sequence

3-2

3.3.1 Planning

3-3

3.3.2 Scheduling

3-5

3.3.3 Operations Phases

3-6

4 Range Scheduling

4-1

4.1 Why Look at Scheduling in Range Operations?

4-1

4.2 Scheduling in General

4-2

4.2.1 Berlin Airlift

4-3

4.2.2 Scheduling Addressed by Womack

4-5

4.3 Current Range Scheduling

4-6

4.3.1 Vandenberg AFB

4-8

4.3.2 Cape Canaveral AS

4-10

4.4 RSA Scheduling

4-13

4.5 Range Scheduling From a Lean Perspective

4-15

4.6 Are Current Processes and Procedures Lean?

4-16

4.6.1 Identify and Optimize Enterprise Flow

4-17

4.6.1.1 Establish Models and/or Simulations

4-17

4.6.1.2 Reduce the Number of Flow Paths

4-18

4.6.1.3 Reduce Setup Times

4-19

4.6.1.4 Maintain Equipment to Minimize Unplanned Stoppages.... 4-22
4.6.2 Assure Seamless Information Flow

4-25

4.6.2.1 Minimize Documentation While Ensuring Data Traceability
and Availability

4-25

4.6.2.2 Link Databases for Key Functions

4-26

4.6.3 Make Decisions At Lowest Possible Level

4-27

5 Recommendations

5-1

5.1 Organizational Structure

5-1

5.2 Automation

5-3

5.2.1 Information Management & Communications

in

5-3

5.2.2 Equipment Reconfiguration

5-4

5.2.3 Maintenance

5-4

5.2.4 Automated Scheduling Systems

5-6

5.3 Integrated Product and Process Teams

5-7

5.4 Primary Value

5-7

5.5 Additional Topics For Study

5-8

6 Conclusions

"~1

Appendix: The Lean Enterprise Model

A-l
BIB

Bibliography

-!

Vita

V-l

IV

List of Figures
Figure 1

Space Industry Launch Revenue [25]

1-3

Figure 2

Launch Rates FY 98 [17: 16,19]

1-4

Figure 3

Work Flow Reality [24]

2-3

Figure 4

Lean Development [23:19]

2-4

Figure 5

LEM Architecture [23:22]

2-6

Figure 6

The Range and the Launch Enterprise

2-10

Figure 7

SLRS Basic Structure [32]

2-17

Figure 8

World Launch Sites [25]

2-18

Figure 9

Expendable Space Launch Scenario [33:22]

3-3

Figure 10 UDS Architecture [1:2-5]

3-5

Figure 11 Launch Operations Process [33:27]

3-6

Figure 12 Range Operations Phases [5]

3-7

Figure 13 Distribution of New Range Needs [28]

3-7

Figure 14 Western Range Geography [4:3]

4-8

Figure 15 Eastern Range Geography [4:2]

4-10

Figure 16 Form for Revision to ER Schedule [29]

4-11

Figure 17 Computer-Aided Range Scheduling [33:25]

4-13

Figure 18 Eastern Range Maintenance Actions [31]

4-24

List of Tables
Table 1

Western Range Maintenance Summary FY 98 [34]

Table 2

LEM Practices and Metrics for Seamless Information Flow, Optimizing

Table 3

4-9

Enterprise Flow, and Making Decisions at the Lowest Level

4-29

Other LEM Practices and Metrics

4-30

VI

List of Acronyms
AF

Air Force

AFB

Air Force Base

AFIT

Air Force Institute of Technology

AFMC

Air Force Materiel Command

AFRL

Air Force Research Laboratories

AFSPC

Air Force Space Command

C&D

Control & Display

CIMPLEST

Cellular Intelligent Manufacturing Production
and Labor Enterprise Tool

CCAS

Cape Canaveral Air Station

COTS

Commercial Off-the-Shelf

CSLRB

Current Launch Schedule Review Board

DLM

Depot-level Maintenance

DMCO

Delta Mission Checkout (Center)

EELV

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle

GCA

Ground Control Approach

GPS

Global Positioning System

IMVP

International Motor Vehicle Program

IPPD

Integrated Product and Process Development

IPPT

Integrated Product and Process Team

IPT

Integrated Product Team

LAI

Lean Aerospace Initiative

LEM

Lean Enterprise Model

LOD

Launch of Demand

MAJCOM

Major Command

MIT

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Vll

MOTR

Multiple Object Tracking Radar

NASA

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

O&M

Operations and Maintenance

OD

Operations Directive

OR

Operations Requirements

ORD

Operational Requirements Document

P&S

Planning & Scheduling

P&W

Pratt & Whittney

PI

Program Introduction

PRD

Program Requirements Document

PSM

Program Support Manager

PSP

Program Support Plan

RLV

Reusable Launch Vehicle

RSA

Range Standardization and Automation Program

RSOR

Range Safety Operation Requirements

SC

Statement of Capability

SLR

Spacelift Range

SLRS

Spacelift Range System

SLRSC

Spacelift Range System Contract

SMC

Space and Missiles Systems Center, AFMC

STAR

Scheduling Toolset for Automated Ranges

TC&C

Telemetry Command and Control

TPM

Total Productive Maintenance

TQM

Total Quality Management

UDS

Universal Documentation System

USAF

United States Air Force

VAFB

Vandenberg Air Force Base

WPAFB

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base

XP

Wing Plans, Planning Office

Vlll

Abstract
This study describes how lean principles and thinking can be applied to space
range operations. The "lean" concepts of the right thing, right place, and the right time
are applicable and relevant to this study. The basis for the lean concepts and principles
considered is the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI).

The LAI originated from the

International Motor Vehicle Program (IMVP) that was conducted by a team from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).

The LAI is a collaborative research

program involving government, industry, labor, and academia (primarily MIT).

The

partnership began in 1993 through support of the U.S. Air Force as the Lean Aircraft
Initiative and was renamed in 1997 as the Lean Aerospace Initiative when it was realized
that lean principles can and should be applied to test and space activities. The partnership
allows the exchange of knowledge and research. As a result, it is expected that there will
be fundamental improvements and added value in industry and government operations.
Thus, the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI) is an important part of the defense
aerospace industry. It strives to understand and use lean practices that will, for example,
improve turnaround times, reduce costs and improve the quality of the processes and
operations involved in providing defense aerospace services and products. Consideration
of lean principles and practices are facilitated through use of the Lean Enterprise Model
(LEM). The model consists of research-based benchmarking data that help identify and
assess leanness. The LEM is designed to tell users what lean is and not necessarily how
to get lean.

IX

This study on space range operations examines how the principles and processes
associated with the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI) and the Lean Enterprise Model
(LEM) can be applied toward scheduling activities and planning at the space launch
ranges at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, and Cape Canaveral Air Station, FL. Current
launch scheduling at both ranges is baselined as well as changes proposed under the U.S.
Air Force's plans to upgrade and replace existing range infrastructure through the Range
Standardization and Automation (RSA) Program. The existing and planned scheduling
practices are then compared to lean concepts and principles. Value-added steps involved
in the scheduling and planning practices are identified using the LEM principles.
This study focus on the space range operations such as telemetry, radar, command
destruct, instrumentation, and infrastructure necessary to facilitate the actual launch itself,
including the operators, maintenance personnel, and contractors.

The organizational

elements are considered along with the operational activities.

The LEM enabling

practices are used to identify suggested supporting practices and metrics to determine if
current scheduling and planning processes are lean.

Elements of the proposed RSA

Program are considered in making recommendations for reducing waste and making
current space range operations more lean.

The RSA Program provides an excellent

framework for incorporating new technologies and automation to enhance range
operations.
While there are aspects of the current and proposed scheduling operations that
were determined to follow lean concepts, areas are found that are considered muda or
waste and do not add any value. Research conducted by MIT, LAI, and the Air Force

Research Laboratory at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, on determining the benefits of lean
practices currently employed by defense aerospace companies is used as a comparison to
determine that there are potential benefits for modifying existing range scheduling
methods and moving toward leaner operations.

XI

SPACE RANGE SCHEDULING
AND THE
LEAN AEROSPACE INITIATIVE

1

Introduction

You may delay, but time will not.
Ben Franklin
Much like the apprehensions felt by a graduate student setting out for the first
time to write a thesis, so too were the feelings of many in roles of military and political
leadership regarding the feasibility and impact of space in the future of warfare and
society.

In 1946, as the U.S. Air Force initially tackled the possibility of placing

satellites in orbit around the Earth with its funding of Project Rand (Research and
Development), naysayers and skeptics abounded, attacking potential costs as well as
technical and military merits. The idea was too "fantastic [38:1]." Historically, this was
not an unexpected response; nevertheless, the nation, as well as the world, pushed
forward toward this new frontier. Only a year later, in 1947, in a follow on to the
inaugural Project Rand study, the issues of satellite reconnaissance and communications
platforms were detailed; the latter of which would become the inroad of private enterprise
into space and the foundation of the commercial space industry [38:25].
The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 enabled the commercialization
of space [9]. This new industry started out slowly, but is now projected to be worth a
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phenomenal $86 billion over the next 10 years [13]. As the value of the space market
grew, the controversy over its development grew with it, specifically, there was the
debate over the need for continued federal direction or a push to empower commercial
industry putting the government in a role more like that of a customer than a provider
[37].
The impetuous to increase commercial presence in space began in the 80s [36]. In
1984, the U.S. implemented its first space-commercialization policy [14]. This Reagan
administration plan focused on developing a space station as a platform for future
commercial activities and deregulation to encourage private commercial endeavors into
space [14]. Also, under Reagan, the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 was enacted
to eliminate some of the bureaucracy involved in the space launch process by centralizing
control under the Department of Transportation [38:226]. Subsequent administrations
followed suit, each providing its own vision for the future of the space industry and
looking to expand opportunities available to the commercial sector [13]. The most recent
thrust comes from the Commercial Space Act of 1997, which, among other things, calls
upon NASA to continue to examine the possibilities and benefits for the private sector in
space, forces the government to look to commercial industry when purchasing space
transportation services, and streamlines licensing for commercial remote sensing projects
[35].
As with any rapidly growing industry, the stake for labor and capital increase
proportionally. Figure 1 shows the revenue from the space launch industry from 199698.

Commercial space firms are now employing thousands of people and making
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investments in new research in space instruments and types of rockets. Remote sensing
is expanding at rapid pace [35]. The benefits that have been realized are innumerable.
But as growth in the space industry continues, the need for cheap access to space will be
a driving force behind its future.
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Figure 1

Space Industry Launch Revenue [25]

Continued elimination of bureaucratic barriers, incentives to increase private
ventures into space, and competition in the space launch industry between various
platforms and countries is providing the necessary incentive to provide inexpensive ways
to place payloads into orbit. Right now, NASA is looking to drive down the $5,000 to
$10,000 cost per pound for low earth orbit. Many of the obstacles to reaching these goals
result from the use of varying types of expendable launch vehicles, launch platforms
designed to meet mostly military needs, and complex, outdated systems requiring large
investments in infrastructure as well as personnel [37]. To combat this, extensive research
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is being done in the areas of reusable launch vehicles (RLVs) and modernization of
America's launch ranges. There is also interest in improving the methods used to prepare
platforms for launch and reducing the manpower and hassle involved in those processes
to create space transportation systems that work best for commercial industry which takes
up a sizable chunk of U.S. range launch rates (see Figure 2).
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There is an addition push of late, from a military standpoint, for reduction of
cycle-times and rapid turn around. From the summer of 1997 to the spring 1998, the
National Space Security Space Architect and the National Reconnaissance Office
conducted a study into the potential benefits of the capability to launch on demand
(LOD). This is of particular concern for the military because it would reduce the number
of on-orbital satellite spares necessary to maintain required operations, reducing postmission downtimes, and eliminating unneeded launches [43].
The concepts "lean" and the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI) are at the forefront
of changing the way many companies and organizations, such as the military, do
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business. The desire for "better, faster, cheaper" products and turn-around has been a
constant fixture in industry, but today, the lean philosophy is proving itself as an effective
way of reaching those goals [23]. It is a new way of doing business. Improvements in
cost, performance, and cycle-time reduction have been seen not only in the auto industry,
but also in defense aerospace. With the successes seen in these areas, it makes sense to
examine where lean principles can be applied in the space launch arena, where cost and
responsiveness are becoming so critical. From launch vehicle preparation and testing, to
range and on-orbit operations, as well as in the operation of RLVs, space planes, and
spaceports, "lean" is looking to assert itself as the best way of meeting future
requirements.

1.1 Purpose of Thesis
While documentation of the implementation of "lean" philosophy in the auto
industry and a few other areas including airplane manufacturing is extensive, only
recently has focus been turned toward its application in space [23]. This thesis is meant to
be a follow-on to research being done at the Air Force Institute of Technology and in
conjunction with similar research at MIT to identify how "lean" can be applied to the
space and spacelift industry. Whereas previous research has looked at the process of
preparing a launch vehicle for deployment, this will look at the range support structure
needed to make that deployment possible [16]. More specifically, it will examine the area
of scheduling as it pertains to U.S. launch ranges.
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The primary goal of this research is to identify how and where lean principles can
be applied to current range scheduling operations.

In addition to this, the U.S. Air

Force's plan to modernize its ranges, the Range Standardization and Automation (RSA)
Program, will be reviewed to determine how this will affect future scheduling. It will
also be important to look at the influence of new technology on the aging U.S. ranges as
part of RSA since the technological improvements to be employed as part of the program
represent the foundation for the infrastructure of the future space range for the United
States. The next step is to, with the help of the Lean Enterprise Model (LEM), identify
tools and practices to make range operations "leaner."
In Chapter 2, the roots of the lean philosophy, LAI, and the RSA program will be
identified as well as outlining the launch enterprise. Chapter 3 will take a closer look at
range operations. Chapter 4 will examine scheduling practices that go on at U.S. space
ranges as well as changes to be made under RSA and look at lean principles applicable to
those activities. Finally, Chapters 5 and 6 will present recommendations and conclusions
based upon those comparisons.
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2

Lean, Launch Enterprise, and RSA

Few things are impossible to diligence and skill.
Brisbane
The United States' space and space launch industry, as well as "lean" have a
relatively short, but rich history. Looking at that history, however briefly, is useful in
examining the major concepts of each. The following chapter is intended to provide a
better understanding of the development of "lean" and its principles, the lean enterprise,
and U.S. range history, including the Range Standardization and Automation program.

2.1 Right Place, Right Time, Right Price
In 1985, American and European car manufacturers, still relying on massproduction techniques developed by Henry Ford, found themselves unable to stem the
tide of increasing market share being taken away by Japanese companies[44:68].
Concerned about how this might affect the U.S. economy in the future, the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT), through its International Motor Vehicle Program (IMVP),
set out to examine current problems facing the world auto industry and specifically take a
detailed look at auto manufacturing techniques [44:5]. What was discovered was an
entirely different way of looking at the process of production.

Different from the

concepts of mass and craft production with which most people were familiar, this type
was dubbed "lean" by the MIT researchers because it was able to do "more with less". It
was their conclusion, that "lean thinking" was the driving force behind Japanese success.
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2.1.1

What is "lean"?
"Lean is about getting the right things to the right place at the right time the first

time while minimizing waste and being open to change [40]." "Lean" is a way of
thinking that forces a producer to take a step back and look at the whole process of
production. This does not just include the operations going on inside the factory itself,
but also all levels of supply, distribution, development and even organization. This
method of doing business starts with the customers. In lean thinking, they are the people
who can best define value [45:16]. It is then the producer's responsibility to make or
provide something that is valuable.

Once value has been determined, the producer

identifies all of the steps that are required in the process to bring that certain product
about. With this done, it becomes possible to see what the essential, value-added steps
are and adjust the production process so that products conflow from start to finish. As
flow is developed, a tailoring of the process occurs so that no up-stream activity can start
until it receives a cue from the activity directly down-stream. This is the idea of pull.
When production is pulled along, impediments to flow are easily seen and opportunities
for improvement can be identified, leading to the last fundamental idea of "lean" perfection [44:19-25].
The advantages that were being realized by Japanese companies from
"lean" production were a result of increased flexibility to consumer and environmental
concerns, decreased inventories, and improved communications and quality.

For

example, in lean manufacturing, if something on the car didn't work at some point during
assembly, then the whole process had to be halted - this was due to perfection [44:79].
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As workers became more and more adept at eliminating problems, down times were
reduced to nearly nothing and rework times dwindled to fix defects identified when the
product had made it through the entire assembly line.

American and European

manufacturers were spending enormous amounts of time, manpower and money to fix
problems that could have been dealt with more easily and cheaply if they had been
discovered earlier in the production cycle [44:81].

What you THINK your process is

N. — *V*07
What it ACTUALLY is

o—*
What it SHOULD be

Figure 3

Work Flow Reality [24]

2.1.2 Lean and Quality Initiatives
Lean distances itself from other quality initiatives and Total Quality Management
(TQM) in the respect that the entire process must be examined. Lean does not have a
narrow focus.

It does not limit itself to one department, one division, or even one

company in the process of performing a service or getting a product to market because
this leads to sub-optimization with each segment of the process attempting to maximize
its own performance without respect to how it fits in with other segments [39]. This can
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potentially be a detriment to cycle times, impact customer satisfaction, and increase cost.
It is essential in lean for everyone to know their role in the big picture. It is through this
that it becomes easier to develop flow, pull, identify value and the value stream, and
move more swiftly toward perfection (see Figure 3). Integrated product and process
teams (IPPTs) also play an important role in defining the process as a whole, reducing
cycle times and production and development lead times. Figure 4 describes the level of
integration that "emerging lean" would like to have.

"Current Lean"

'Old Approach"

Prime

Rigid vertical
FFF interfaces
and control

Figure 4

Collaborative with rigid
organizational
interfaces

'Emerging Lean"
Virtual Team
wto boundaries
enabling architectural
innovation

Lean Development [23:19]

2.1.3 Lean Aerospace Initiative
When MIT published its study in 1990 in the book, The Machine That Changed
the World, interest in "lean" began to spread. Many people saw applications for it in
their own businesses; the lean principles were not just limited to large-scale production,
but could have a positive impact on any number of activities, including services, training
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and infrastructure [16:2-5]. These improvements and changes even caught the eyes of the
Air Force.
In 1993, motivated by the IMVP study and interested in the application of lean in
the defense aerospace industry, contractors, labor unions, MIT and the U.S. Air Force,
formed the Lean Aircraft Initiative (LAI) to focus primarily on defense aircraft [16:2-5].
The intent was to benchmark the most effective industry practices as well a system for
organizing and implementing lean research and principles.

The LAI tailored lean

practices, such as optimized product flow and integrated product and process
development (IPPD), to fit its own specific industry. A Lean Enterprise Model (LEM)
was also developed so that the effects of lean could be measured, shared, and applied
[23:23]. Its architecture is shown (Figure 5) below and a copy of the LEM is attached as
Appendix B.
In 1997, the name of the Lean Aircraft Initiative was changed to the Lean
Aerospace Initiative [16:2-5]. The principles and practices of lean and the LEM were
directed not only toward the aircraft industry, but also toward the space and spacelift
industries.

Collaborative participation was expanded and the focus shifted from

benchmarking to cycle-time reductions and topics of mutual interest to both the aircraft
and space industries. This constituted a second phase of LAI evolution [41].
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LEM Architecture [23:22]

Currently, emphasis within the Lean Aerospace Initiative consortium is on finding
the best life-cycle value and the best methods for implementing lean and eliminating
barriers and resistance to change. This is the third phase of LAI. It is now necessary for
the Initiative to make the most of the cooperation, collaboration and research that has
been developed, formed and produced [41].

2.1.3.1

Lean A ircraft Successes
Lean has already proven itself to be applicable in the aircraft industry.

For

example, Pratt & Whittney (P&W) began to make lean changes in its aircraft engine
production in the 1990s after it found that it was unable to compete with other engine
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companies, such as Rolls-Royce and General Electric, in that industry.

In the 1980s, P

& W, with its mass production techniques in place since WWII, was unable to fix
operational problems with its engines and had an unenviable record of mechanical
problems. It was also sluggish in dealing with customer complaints, and could not react
quickly enough to the changing engine markets, since long lead times for products
required predicting where the market would go [45:162-3]. After pursuing a series of lean
improvements, Pratt was able to reduce overdue parts from $80 million to zero, cut
inventory in half, and doubled labor production. This occurred in only two years and
began by constructing a value stream map of the process, and reconfiguring business
units so value was properly channeled for each of their product families. They also
rearranged machines in the assembly plants in the same order as the processing steps to
force single-piece flow of products [45:175].

2.1.3.2 Push Toward Space Applications
As mentioned before, lean is in the process of being implemented in the space
industry, the most recent example being the Boeing Delta II launch vehicle. The Delta
team began in 1989 by analyzing its pad qualification and pre-launch procedures. By
examining the total processing flow, a number of changes to eliminate impediments to
flow were identified and implemented. Procedural changes, and better testing and floor
space utilization in the Delta mission checkout center (DMCO), reduced the on-pad time
necessary from 34 to 29 days. Additional changes to infrastructure, test facilities, and
streamlining initiatives, as well as reexamining the launch processing flow after each
change to identify additional improvement opportunities, have reduced the on-pad
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benchmark to 23 days, with some missions taking only 21. This was down from an
original on-pad time of 40 days [16:3-25].
These results helped to propel research for application of lean into other areas of
space operations. Range operations, on-orbit operations, infrastructure, maintenance, and
satellite systems testing are all being examined for the possibilities of improvement
through lean practices. With international competition driving continued growth of the
commercial space sector, and the need for an ever-increasing presence in space,
government and industry are searching for ways to keep themselves viable and relevant
in this changing environment. The lean approach can provide this needed flexibility.

2.2 The Launch Enterprise
In his book, Lean Thinking, Womack mentions that the first problem when
looking to make any process lean was being able to look at the process as a whole - being
able step back and really look at what is going into producing your product or providing
your service [45:276]. He asserts that there needs to be a mechanism created for doing
this - the lean enterprise.

2.2.1

Why Examine The Whole Process
It becomes apparent, when one thinks about it, why it would be necessary to

examine the entire process, especially when it pertains to the complicated, highly
technical and highly expensive activity of launching a payload into space. The "launch
enterprise" is made up of numerous processes and organizations each with an important
role in the whole - materials suppliers providing composites for the payloads and launch
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vehicles, aerospace firms and their divisions testing and building the payloads, software
companies designing the programs to be used for range operators to communicate,
schedule and plan the launches, the range operators who will carry out the launch, and the
list goes on. The usual tendency is for each organization is to optimize its operations to
deliver something of value for the customer based on what it feels its role is in providing
it [45:276]. When one pieces all of the operations for each firm which have been
individually optimized along the value stream, one may end up with a process that is
itself sub-optimized. Each piece is contributing what it feels is the necessary value, but it
may not fit in with its role in the entire process. It is important for all organizations along
the stream (the launch enterprise), including the customer, to coordinate so that there are
no questions about how everything falls into place. For this reason, it is beneficial to
provide a quick overview of the launch process in order to show how everything fits
together in spite of the fact that this thesis will only be covering range aspects.

2.2.2

U.S. Space Launch Flow
The launch of a vehicle and payload into space is an involved process that

includes numerous activities, many people, resources, and mountains of documentation
(the purpose of lean being to reduce all of the above). Like any large process, it can be
grouped into very broad areas to produce a good overview. The process starts with the
organization wanting to place a payload into space.

After doing its own studies to

determine the feasibility of the payload and what it might require in the way of launch
resources, that organization would contact the space wing plans division (XP) at the
range they need to launch from (Vandenberg, Cape Canaveral for U.S.). XP works with
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the organization anywhere from 90 days to 5 years as the payload is designed and
produced to determine what is required from the range and the base installation in the
way of resources and support and if those requirements can be met. [21] Portions of the
construction and integration of the payload take place at the ranges. The launch vehicle
and payload are then mated, typically, for U.S. sites, at the pad. Testing of the complete
system and launch dates must be scheduled and coordinated for range use.
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Figure 6

The Range and the Launch Enterprise
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Prior to launch, the range must be reconfigured to support the new mission. This
includes communications, radars, optics for recording the flight, telemetry and telemetry
distribution. Safety and weather issues are addressed as the launch nears. Immediately
after liftoff, the vehicle must be monitored in the event it is necessary to destroy it.
Ground stations up and down range, and often around the world, track the vehicle. While
this is going on, the launch pad is refurbished and made ready for another launch.
Finally, on-orbit operations occur once the vehicle is in place. Figure 6 shows the flow of
these activities as well as which ones may or do occur at the launch range itself.
Throughout the process maintenance, upgrades, and training must also be scheduled and
performed.

2.3 The Advent of RSA
Until Air Force restructuring created Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), the
Air Force managed U.S. ranges at Vandenberg (VAFB) and Cape Canaveral (CCAS) had
their own commanders, policies, procedures and equipment [42]. Essentially the two
ranges were operating as two separate entities until being organized together under one
unit in the early 1990s. Even today, there is little standardization between the two ranges,
in spite of the fact that the two launch similar systems. This is partly because of the 40
years of independent evolution that the ranges have undergone and the geography of each
range. For example, the fog at VAFB has driven a no optical visibility requirement there,
but optics is a mandatory requirement at Cape Canaveral. Greater occurrence of storms
cause a larger dependence on weather forecasting at CCAS, and on-shore flow at
Vandenberg makes debris risk analysis more important there [27].
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In addition, both ranges are still using equipment that was originally installed in
the 1960s [18]. The low power command destruct used on John Glenn's shuttle flight in
1998 was the same one used on his Mercury-Redstone flight, for example. Additionally,
until the 1980s when space commercial interests began to assert themselves, the ranges
operated primarily to support military payloads.

Concern about making U.S. ranges

competitive in a global commercial launch market was never an issue. If the process
worked well enough to meet necessary military requirements, then there was no need to
change anything [19].

2.3.1

Need For Change
Today, almost half a century after space flight had become a reality, problems and

concerns over U.S. launch ranges resulting from the environment in which they operated
for so long (and other reasons which will be mentioned later in this section) have began
to show up. Not only that, they have inserted themselves into a place of high national
priority because of the ever-growing spacelift industry.

The knowledge base is

dwindling, requirements for specialized training needed to keep these obsolete systems
running is expanding, and the Air Force estimates that there are in excess of 25,000 outof-date range system components which cannot be fixed because there are no more spares
[16:2-13].

Air Force Space Command has declared that "continued production,

operation, and maintenance of [today's launch] vehicles are cost ineffective for two
reasons: (1) escalating expenses associated with inefficient launch systems and their
excessive infrastructure, and (2) outdated technologies, designs and manufacturing
techniques [16:2-13]." These factors have led to supportability problems, reliability
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problems, and logistical support problems.

All of this prompted the Air Force to

undertake a major effort to overhaul the Spacelift Range System [4]. This was the genesis
of the Range Standardization and Automation Program.

2.3.2 Development Falters
When development of the U.S. space program began, it was under the direction of
some of the most brilliant scientists in America. Because of the fact that space was new
ground, everything had to be state-of-the-art. They used the most advanced equipment of
the day, and during the 1950s and 1960s due to the focus on the space race and on
ballistic missiles, a great deal of money was being spent for Air Force, Army and Navy
research and development in space [19]. In 1970, the Eastern range was considered to be
the most modern of the two U.S. launch ranges, and at that time, it began to receive
modifications to support the Space Shuttle. Prior to the Challenger disaster in early 1986,
Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg were modernized only as they related to the Shuttle.
The Western range at Vandenberg was given significant improvements since the Eastern
range at CCAS was still fairly current due to the Apollo program [19]. After Challenger,
the push was toward restoring the Shuttle to operational status and focusing more on the
need for expendable launch vehicles that would have to be used in the mean time. The
limited amount of funds available required prioritization of range needs and little was
spent on range modernization.

At the lower levels, money was spent only to keep

systems functioning. It was decided that rather than make continuous improvements, the
existing systems would continue to be kept in working order and little would be done to
modernize [19].
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2.3.3

The Restructure Of Systems Command, Start OfRSA
Prior to 1990, the operational portion of the Western Range was run by Strategic

Air Command, with the Western Test Range falling under Air Force Systems Command
and responsible for research and development.

The Eastern Range was also under

Systems Command as it, too, was considered a test range. In October 1990 all assets at
both ranges were assigned to Air Force Space Command as part of Air Force
realignment. Acquisitions for those ranges were moved to Air Force Materiel Command
[19].
Because of outdated equipment and lack of spare parts for the systems that were
currently being used, the Air Force wanted to update the communications backbone at
Cape Canaveral, establish a new control center at Patrick AFB, and update the telemetry
processing system at Vandenberg AFB. As different aspects of the ranges and parts of
Systems Command were being reassigned, Space Command decided that it would like to
standardize the two ranges as long as upgrades were being made anyway [22]. The idea
was to save on design costs as well as have economy of scale; so all contracts were
bundled together into a single project to bid to one contractor. What resulted was the
Range Standardization and Automation Program Phase I (RSA I), to be carried out by the
Harris Corporation.
In 1993, RSA I began, focusing primarily on the Eastern Range. The data, voice
and video backbone at Cape Canaveral were upgraded, a dedicated wide area
communications network was set up, as well as new networking systems and real-time
and non real-time telemetry processing, display, and archival [19].
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Harris tried to

develop a unified tracking antenna for telemetry, communications, and radar, but was
unable to make it work ($50 million overrun) [6].

2.3.4 RSA Today
In 1995, another phase of RSA was awarded to Lockheed Martin. While phase I
was primarily intended to fix immediate and urgent needs for improvement at the Eastern
Range, phase II was intended to be more proactive at fixing and identifying problems at
both ranges.

Specifically, RSA II is tasked with "architecting (sic) the first modern,

automated and standardized range system, ever [18]." This new system, which is
responsible for launch control over both ranges and public safety protection during the
initial 5000 miles of flight, is called the SLRS or Spacelift Range System. The intent of
the effort was to change the range launch operations concept and architecture to lead to a
more efficient acquisition and presentation of information, centralize control of range
operations, and automate range assets while maintaining an adequate level of safety [32].
RSA II is designed to rectify the following situations: unresponsive spacelift and
costly, inflexible launch ranges. The following activities are planned: [16:4-6]
•

Consolidate instrumentation using unified tracking antennas at remote tracking
sites.

•

Upgrade the Cape Canaveral communications backbone with a fiber optics
network to allow redundant communications capability, increased data rate and
bandwidth, and increased communications reliability.
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•

Build a centralized telemetry processing systems for both ranges, and upgrade the
range operations control centers at the eastern (Cape Canaveral) and western
(Vandenberg AFB) ranges.

•

Upgrade imaging, surveillance, and weather systems.

•

Upgrade debris tracking systems and multiple objects tracking radar (MOTR).
By making these adjustments, the Air Force is looking to reduce range

configuration times, standardize range operations and architecture, eliminate in-house
depot maintenance and fabrication, and update the 25,000 obsolete range components.
RSAIIA divides the SLRS into three main segments (Figure 7): control & display
(C&D), instrumentation, and networking [16]. C&D provides for centralized archival of
all data, control and display weather, infrastructure, planning and scheduling, range and
flight operations and data product services.

Main features of this segment include:

common infrastructure, extensive use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware,
picture-in-picture video displays, standardized internal and external network interfaces,
and a centralized network manager to enable operations from one console.

The

instrumentation segment deals with metrics, weather, telemetry, vehicle uplink, imaging
and space objects.

It will include GPS for metric tracking, mobile optics, standard

imaging, and will balance the utilization of existing and emerging technologies. The
final segment, networking, is responsible for data transmission, video, and network
management. This segment will incorporate a synchronous optical network, data path
redundancy, compressed real-time video, and modernized voice switching and
communications panels. Under this new SLRS architecture, most operations personnel
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will reside in a centralized Operations Control Center and most maintenance personnel in
a separate Maintenance Control Center [32].
Control & DisplayV
» data archival
• C &D weather- ~J
' *-. -injrästtueture
• '■ H
• planning &
scheduling
•range & flight ops
• data product services

Centralized Operations
Center

Figure 7

SLRS Basic Structure [32]

These improvements are to be delivered in six Range Delivery Increments each
focusing on specific areas. The first two of which are in the process of being delivered as
of the writing of this thesis [19].

2.3.5

Where Does Lean Fit In?
Since RSA is the future of the U.S. spacelift infrastructure, it is necessary to take

care that it will be able to meet the ever-changing requirements ofthat industry. Not only
should the technological improvements of American ranges be an important issue, but
also the procedures for the launch process itself.

Technological improvements and

automation can, indeed, go a long way toward improving current cycle-times and
infrastructure, but there may be fundamental problems in the process itself which need to
examined and evaluated.

Otherwise, the full potential of the ranges may never be

2-17

reached. This could seriously impact the ability of the U.S. to compete in the spacelift
industry internationally (world launch sites are shown in Figure 8) and continue to
hamper initiatives to reduce costs per pound into space and turnaround times. Lean and
the lean enterprise model can provide the necessary evaluation and implementation tools
to enable perfection to be reached.
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Launch Operations

The effects of accelerated enemy research and development in
preparation for war helped to create an opportunity for aggression which
was promptly exploited. This lesson was the most expensive we ever had
to learn. We must make certain that we do not forget it.
Agreement signed between National Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics (NACA) and the U.S. services

It is important to examine the range itself before moving on. For the purpose of
this thesis the term range or spacelift range (SLR) is not meant to refer to activities done
on the range to prepare the vehicle itself for launch.

It is meant to encompass the

telemetry, radars, command destruct, instrumentation and infrastructure necessary to
facilitate the actual launch itself and the operators, maintainers, and contractors that work
in those areas.

3.1 Range Functions
The primary mission of the SLR is to facilitate spacelift operations [4:6]. It needs
to support "sub-orbital launches, launch of vehicles into orbit and interplanetary space,
test and evaluation of ballistic missiles, guided weapons, and aeronautical programs;
space surveillance; and when requested, international launch activities [5]." In order to
execute this mission the range must be able to protect the surrounding population,
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property, and for that matter, the environment from the hazards that are involved with
launching a spacecraft. It also has to posses the ability to collect, process, and distribute
necessary data to required areas within the range and to the customer. Essentially, the
range provides launch facilities, safety for those facilities and during launch, command
destruct, telemetry, optics, tracking and the maintenance of those systems [5].

3.2 Range Elements
The elements of the range consist of a range squadron, space launch squadrons,
maintenance, and planning. Command destruct of the launch vehicle, radar and telemetry
reconfiguration, and launch area safety are carried out by the military; for the most part,
by the range squadron. The space launch squadrons provide oversight and engineering
management for the preparation of the launch vehicles, which is carried out mostly by the
contractor in charge of the mission. Maintenance, planning, scheduling, and training for
the launch facilities and range operators are performed by a mix of military and
government employees.

3.3 Space Launch Sequence
For a first-time mission, the flow of events through the SLR architecture for an
expendable launch vehicle follows a particular path. This path consists of five main
phases: planning, scheduling, pre-launch operations, launch operations, and post-launch
operations [33:22]. Figure 9 depicts how those phases fit together.
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3.3.1

Expendable Space Launch Scenario [33:22]

Planning
Planning, in essence, is a matter of selecting enterprise objectives, and developing

the policies and procedures and programs necessary to make them possible [20:519]. It
involves decision-making and selecting between alternatives. If a project is not properly
planned, it can be doomed from the start or lead to excessive time-consuming and
expensive changes. At the space range, planning involves a number of activities and
organizations both inside and outside of the range.

It encompasses both broad and

specific requirements for the execution of the mission. The typical lead time for missions
performed at U.S. space launch ranges today for major programs involving range
modification (such as Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle) is from three to five years to
around 60 to 90 days for some that are well established and that the range already has the
capability to provide support [26].
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The system used to provide the necessary paperwork and documentation for U.S.
launch ranges is called the Universal Documentation System (UDS). UDS provides a
common system for them to communicate requirements and determine capabilities in
order for them to coordinate air, space, land, and sea efforts [26]. The UDS consists of
three levels of documentation each composed of one part handled by the contractor and
one part handled by the AF space wing.
Level 1 or the first series of documents involving a new launch program begins
with a letter (not part of the UDS) submitted by the range user. This letter may not have
a date, booster type, or payload specification. However, it serves to get the ball rolling on
documentation as far as what might be needed in the way of systems or infrastructure and
if the range can process the launch vehicle and meet those requirements [8]. This leads to
a Program Introduction (PI) document, which is prepared by the range user [33:22]. This
PI statement is then sent to XP for review and to enable the range to produce a Statement
of Capability (SC) based upon basic requirements set forth in the PI [33:22]. This lets the
user know if the range has the capability to provide the necessary services.
Approximately a year prior to launch, a Program Requirements Document (PRD)
is prepared [8]. This is a detailed document that includes technical data and schematics
[8]. The range user works in conjunction with a Program Support Manager (PSM)
assigned to be their single point of contact with the range squadron [33:22]. The PSM is
responsible for coordinating inputs from organizations around the range for the
preparation of the other part of UDS level two, the Program Support Plan (PSP). This
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document is used by those range organizations for their own preparation and analysis
[33:23].
The third level of the UDS is the most detailed. Operations Requirements (OR)
documents are prepared by the user.

This includes data on detailed vehicle design,

trajectory data, on-board telemetry systems, and antenna patterns [33:23]. This
information is the user input into the Range Safety Operation Requirements (RSOR) and
establishes the necessary precautions and equipment needed to ensure a safe launch
[33:24]. Finally, approximately thirty days prior to launch, an OD, or Operations
Directive, is produced specific to each mission. This is done by the range squadron and
serves, essentially, as the "launch bible" for that mission [8]. The entire UDS architecture
is shown in Figure 10.
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UDS Architecture [1:2-5]

3.3.2 Scheduling
As more and more specific details are provided, actual "operations" are scheduled
based on the "pre-planned objectives, requirements, assets, configurations, and times"
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that are spelled out in the OD [33:25]. Scheduling is used by the range to control the
operations that occur at the range and will be discussed further in the next chapter.

3.3.3

Operations Phases
Operations within the SLR occur in a series of three phases: pre-launch, launch,

and post-launch [33:26]. These phases are described as generation, execution, and
recovery in the Operational Requirements Document for the RSA program, and so this
terminology will be used in this thesis. Figure 11 shows, in some detail, the launch
operations process and how it fits in with planning and scheduling.

Support-

^^

A LRR
A
HRR
Ä

I« sit <»n^

A

A
A A
launch

A A
A A
A

Pt*S*-F»Q*tr iRwv*

Figure 11

Launch Operations Process [33:27]

During the generation phase, planning and scheduling of launch activities,
calibration and verification of the SLR and its subsystems for launch, and rehearsals and
simulations for that launch occur. When the launch is executed, the range supports the
necessary instrumentation, telemetry, launch countdown and tracking required for the
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particular mission. During recovery, securing and shutdown of the range is performed,
launch data is archived as required, and post-operation analysis occur (see figure 12) [5].

Generation.
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•General support

Recovery

Execution

•Securing and shutdown
•Performance evaluation
-E»ata reduction &

•Readiness
•Operational support
-General support

Figure 12

•General support

Range Operations Phases [5]

It is important to note the overall distribution of range needs for the entire launch
cycle. Figure 13 displays the distribution of needs for U.S. ranges in the future. Planning
and scheduling do not take up a relatively large piece of the chart shown in figure 13.
They do, however, exert control, have effects on, or are affected by nearly all of the items
mentioned.
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Distribution of New Range Needs [28]
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4

Range Scheduling

We can lick gravity, but sometimes the paperwork is
overwhelming.
Dr. Wernher von Braun
Utilization and effective management of resources in a process including time,
people and materials is, understandably, an important issue for the success of that
process.

A good portion of that effective management is facilitated through proper

scheduling, especially in today's changing and competitive commercial environments
where it is necessary to continually seek "new and better control techniques to cope with
the complexities, masses of data, and tight deadlines... [20:641]" Scheduling plays an
important role in handling customer demand, controlling inventories, managing customer
orders and requests, and enabling proper throughput through the process. All of these are
areas where muda (waste) can occur and impede flow. These impediments will greatly
affect the takt time, which sets the production pace to meet the demand of the customer.
For example, if there is a demand for three launches each month from a given space
range, the takt time is thirty days divided by three or ten days per launch. Takt time is the
centerpiece of any lean system [45:310].

4.1 Why Look at Scheduling in Range Operations?
With regard to the operation of space ranges, scheduling also plays an important
role.

There are tests, training, maintenance and operations that must be tightly
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coordinated to ensure the most efficient use of range assets. Launch dates planned out
and scheduled in advance may need to be changed for a number of reasons like weather,
civilian traffic, technical delays and mechanical delays. The effects of these changes can
have a cascading effect on any number of activities occurring at later dates. Because of
this, process flow can suffer, as well as the schedule time for the system, thereby
degrading capacity and responsiveness.

Scheduling, as mentioned before, involves

allocating resources and operations based on objectives, requirements, assets, and
configurations determined to be necessary for various launch and training missions
occurring throughout the range. Through the application of lean techniques, it may be
possible to improve scheduling flexibility to better handle day-to-day operations and last
minute changes.

4.2 Scheduling in General
We all know, just through what goes on in our daily lives, how difficult it is to
coordinate a number of activities and responsibilities and get everything done that needs
to be. One solution to this problem is to hire a private secretary to do all our scheduling
and a chauffeur to whisk us around to all our appointments. For the majority of us,
however, it is necessary to perform our own time management, prioritization, and
transportation, and, if we're lucky, we may even get everything done and have an hour or
two left over to fit in some sleep.
More often than not, something comes up that causes us to make changes in our
plans. This typically results in a few phone calls to be made and a few eraser marks in
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our planners. When there is rearranging that must occur, this best case scenario is that we
are able to talk directly to the person with whom we are changing our appointment to
coordinate the necessary adjustments. Leaving a message on voice mail or e-mail or with
someone else or talking to someone else who might not be completely "in the loop" can
lead to problems, conflicts, or other complications. While effective scheduling may be
difficult, it can be and has been done.

4.2.1

Berlin Airlift
A good example of lean scheduling, on the basis of continuous flow, delivery and

production synchronization and using new technology to improve cycle times was the
Berlin Airlift in 1948. After Russian forces effectively shut down all automobile and rail
traffic to the Western sector of the city and refused to supply food to that area, U.S.
military government in Europe and Great Britain decided that it would be necessary to
mount an airlift of supplies [30].
On June 26, 32 USAF C-47s transported 80 tons of food from West Germany into
Tempelhof Airport inside of Berlin. As the seriousness of the situation continued to
escalate, additional aircraft (35 C-54 transports) from various locations in Alaska, Hawaii
and the Caribbean were sent in to help out. This was effectively the beginning of the
airlift. At that time it was code-named, Operation VITTLES. When it was obvious that
the airlift would need to continue for some time the operation was renamed the Airlift
Task Force and included both U.S. and British forces [30].
Five U.S. Air Force troop carrier groups, as well as U.S. Navy air transport
groups and RAF transports were involved in the operations.
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The U.S. Military Air

Transport Service established ferry routes to fly air operations between Europe and repair
depots in the United States. Daily totals of the tonnage transported by each group were
published in newspapers distributed to airlift personnel in an effort to increase the levels
of materials sent in [30].
A variety of planes were utilized, each according to its respective capability. The
faster and larger C-54s were used exclusively in American sectors.

C-82 "Flying

Boxcars" from the U.S. were used to ship cargo too bulky for the 54s. The enormous C74 "Globemasters" were used to bring in parts and engines for C-54s participating in the
airlift to keep them up and running. Even B-24 Liberator bombers were converted and
used to haul diesel fuel for English vehicles [30].
At Tempelhof Airport in Berlin, a Ground Controlled Approach (GCA) Radar
system was installed to help better handle air operations.

The new system made it

possible to conduct all-weather operations. The led to the achievement of the world's
record (at the time) for GCA operations when in April 1949 during one six-hour period
and average of one transport was brought in every four minutes [30].
Operations became more and more routine as the processes involved in the
operation became well established.

The flow of airplanes into the city was only

hampered by icing in the clouds and other winter weather problems. Close scheduling of
arriving and departing airplanes and the quick loading and unloading of cargo continued
to improve. Unloading crews reduced the necessary time to service an aircraft from 17
minutes to 5 [3:6-3]. Turnaround time in Berlin was cut in half [3:6-3]. When the
Russians finally ceased the blockade and the airlift officially ended in July of 1949, an
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unheard of 2,231,599.8 tons of supplies had been transported to the city over the course
of less than a year [30].
The round-the-clock operations of the Berlin Airlift and the continuous flow of
supplies that was achieve is an excellent example of what a "lean" scheduling operation
might look like based on the Lean Enterprise Model. Delivery and production were
synchronized throughout the value chain with the coordination of numerous organizations
in different areas of the world.

Continuous flow was orchestrated and coordinated

through scheduling ground and air operations within Berlin.

Ways to involve new

technology to reduce cycle times and turnaround times were examined and implemented.
Constant improvement was sought to make the airlift more successful and efficient. All
of these are important aspects of the lean philosophy and way of getting things done.

4.2.2 Scheduling Addressed by Womack
Womack and Jones address scheduling in Lean Thinking, by illustrating a concept
known to the Toyota company as "level scheduling [45:70]." This involves taking the
orders for a certain part or product over a certain period of time and determining the takt
times for each part and the changeover speeds necessary for the production of those parts.
These figures are then used to produce a schedule for the time duration, which is then
distributed to the areas involved in the production process.
Level scheduling can, however, find itself at the mercy of excessive inventories
and unusual fluctuations in demand. The solution to this problem is to concentrate on
keeping costs constant and produce only enough to meet actual need [45:82]. Long leadtimes and flat demand can create a perceived volatility in a consumer market. There
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needs to be an elimination of lead-times so that "demand is instantly reflected in new
supply... [45:88]."

4.3 Current Range Scheduling
Prior to the creation of AF Space Command and AF Materiel Command from Air
Force Systems and Logistics Commands in the early 1990s, the two U.S. ranges at
Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral were, in essence, autonomous units [34]. Thus
scheduling, engineering, range operations, communications and all other range functions
were under the control of the range itself.

What made this desireable was that the

scheduling department was able to talk directly to maintenance or operations or the
customer to allocate range usage and make appropriate changes to the range schedule. It
also made it possible to work conflicts out at lower levels of the chain-of-command [34].
Under Air Force Systems Command, the customer was able to come directly to
scheduling with a conflict, which would then be able to provide the best solution and
utilization of range resources [34]. What happened as a result of the Air Force
reorganization was a fundamental change in the way scheduling was to operate and react
to changes.
Under the new structure, AF Materiel Command, headquartered at WrightPatterson AFB in Ohio, but with a space component (the Space and Missile Systems
Center) at Los Angeles AFB, CA, was given control over the engineering and
acquisitions aspects of the ranges. Air Force Space Command, headquartered at Peterson
AFB, CO, was then responsible for the operations and maintenance and control of the
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range facilities themselves [26]. The ranges were restructured to mirror that of a "typical"
Air Force wing. Maintenance was placed in the logistics group and the range squadron
and scheduling were placed in the operations group all under the direction of a wing
commander. As a result of this, scheduling operations became more involved.
In general, scheduling is done on a first-come-first-served basis, although
scientific and national emergencies can take precedence. The WR range is typically
running one shift, where two to three used to be used. This reduction was due to budget
drawbacks. On the ER contacted work and unions place limits on shifts and work hours
[11]. A master schedule for the ranges, the CSLRB, or Current Launch Schedule Review
Board, is kept at Headquarters Air Force Space Command at Peterson AFB, CO. This
schedule is user driven, but there can be problems getting on the schedule less than 90
days before launch [26]. It was initially necessary to go to HQ AFSPC to change
launches, but that authority has come down to the wing commander level. After all the
other ranges have been checked to approve a date and make sure they are available a
request goes up to the respective wing commander for approval [34]. However,
scheduling has already informally been committed for that launch before that approval.
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Figure 14 Western Range Geography [4:3]

4.3.1

Vandenberg AFB
The situation at Vandenberg AFB (see Figure 14) changed in a number of ways

from the pre-AFSPC era. In order to get activities done, which used to be accomplished
by coordinating between different organizations at the range, it now became necessary to
go much higher up the chain of command. For maintenance, this meant going through
the wing commander. For the customer, this meant going to the range commander, then
to the maintenance commander and on up the chain until they could get the results they
needed [34]. This type of action has been given the moniker "stovepiping." Much like
the flame and smoke from a wood burning stove are forced to travel up through the
stovepipe, so too were scheduling, maintenance, customers, and operators forced to travel
up the stovepipe of the space wing chain-of-command.
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With the increased difficulties in coordination and decrease in scheduling
flexibility, a sort of "what if scheduling procedure came about [34]. If maintenance
personnel thought they might need to do some work on the range, they would schedule it.
There might not need to be anything done, but it was easier to do that, than try to go up
the "stovepipe" to get the necessary maintenance or upgrade time at the last minute. This
also led to operations versus maintenance versus training time mentality within the range,
each one looking to have priority over the other [23]. Giving operations priority can make
it difficult to perform range upgrades and necessary maintenance. What has resulted is
that there is an adversarial relationship between scheduling and maintenance, and built-in
problems now exist with maintenance versus operational time [34]. In 1998 there were
more than 60 days of dedicated downtime for maintenance [34]. Table 1 shows the
maintenance summary for the WR in fiscal year 1998. Scheduling needs the flexibility to
work around those downtimes and eliminate the need to close pads. That flexibility is no
longer there [34]. Training takes its toll, too. Constant training requires three to four
people to do the job of one person. You need a trainer, evaluator, someone to train, and,
many times, the person who is being replaced. Range assets must be used and time must
be blocked out where nothing else can be done [34].
Table 1

Western Range Maintenance Summary FY 98 [34]

Maintenance Action
Scheduled
Unscheduled
Modifications
Totals
Range Down Days For Maintenance

Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sept
339
394
372
319
48
87
68
73
23
35
26
19
422
507
463
411
0
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4.3.2

Cape Canaveral AS
Cape Canaveral has a slightly different role and situation in the U.S. range

structure. There is a larger demand in the space industry market for equatorial launches
and the Eastern Range at the Cape is where the United States performs those launches as
shown in Figure 15. This places a greater burden on that range as far as resources and
capacity are concerned. Cape Canaveral is busier than Vandenberg and therefore finds
itself under tighter scrutiny and as the principle target for concern as part of the Space
Launch Range System [17].
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Figure 15

Eastern Range Geography [4:2]

Customer requests drive the scheduling process, and competitive urgency drives
customers to stand firm on launch dates. The need for schedule and resource changes
may arise on the range.

When this occurs, the manual intervention of scheduling

personnel is required to resolve these conflicts. In 1998, the Cape had 31 firings with 88
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range calendar date changes [29]. A great deal of skill is required to handle these changes
to maximize user access to resources and to persuade customers to trade off highly
coveted launch dates [29]. Turbulence in the schedule can consume capacity and
manpower.

Routinely scheduled operations do not require approval outside of the

scheduling organization. If the range is available, one can obtain a range requirement
number and be placed on the schedule; however, launch date changes do result in a
number of complications.
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Figure 16

Form for Revision to ER Schedule [29]

Change requests must be submitted at least 30 calendar days prior to the launch
date in question, or users run the risk of having their launch date made indefinite until
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approval can be obtained. Approvals must be coordinated through the Range Squadron
Director of Operations, the squadron commander, the Operations Deputy Commander,
the Operations Group Commander, and the Wing Commander (see Figure 16). The
scheduling itself is done on the assumption that two launch attempts will be made
available to the user, with the second attempt, if necessary, falling within a 24-hour
period. Additional time can be taken and other accommodations made, but this must be
negotiated with the range [2:7].
Typically at Cape Canaveral, launches occur on Thursdays, with preparation for
launch (reconfiguration, setups, calibrations, certifications) completed on Monday,
allowing crew rest on Wednesday; however, there is no date that cannot be a launch date.
Sometimes preparation occurs on the day prior to launch. Checkouts and internal pad
support are typically two days prior to launch. Training can also occur for missions other
than the type currently being supported for launch [29]. The Range Operations Schedule
is firm after a weekly scheduling conference normally held each Thursday morning [2:5].
Launch priorities are set up on a first-come-first-served basis.

Operations

priorities are usually set first. Planned maintenance typically is not considered critical
enough that it cannot be rescheduled. However, equipment failures may take priority
[29]. Inter-range support, worldwide communications, national urgency, space or
scientific achievement and Department of Defense contingency exercises also figure
heavily in the launch schedule [2:5]. Training occurs during the time remaining.
Rehearsals for launch can also tie up a many range resources and involve a number of
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people.

For most launches there are 2-3 significant rehearsals or combined system

operations [29].

4.4 RSA Scheduling
The Range Standardization and Automation Program (both phases) is meant to
build a system that is common at both ranges [34]. It also has the capability to automate a
number of the tasks involved in the scheduling process. Planning and scheduling (P&S)
is a subsystem of the RSA IIA architecture.

This new architecture uses the NDI

scheduling engine currently used by NASA to support Shuttle missions. As modified for
RSA, it is known as the Scheduling Toolset for Automated Ranges (STAR) and
incorporates additional commercial off-the-self packages to augment the basic engine
currently in use [32:455].
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Figure 17

Computer-Aided Range Scheduling [33:25]

Planning data for each mission is fed into a common database for use by range
users, planners, and schedulers as depicted in Figure 17. As each level of documentation
is completed, the database provides that data, such as mission definition and
requirements, to STAR. Weather information, range and flight operations information,
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and data from other analysis subsystems on the range are also fed into the STAR engine.
The information and data are then used by STAR to automatically generate schedules,
provide conflict resolution, and establish resource requirements. If a schedule change is
needed, the database is updated and the Range Planner is notified [32:455]. Additionally,
the programs used for user interface will be changed.

This is to be a significant

improvement on the Eastern Range [11].
The idea behind the changes and automation is to free up resources (people
specifically) in order to better utilize existing manpower [29]. Standardization between
the two ranges is also meant to reduce paperwork. For example, reports are currently
unstandardized. Scheduling takes those reports from each range, looks them over, finds
the differences, and then makes appropriate changes. Some of these differences between
the ranges include how scheduling is approved, the roles of the various operations
personnel, and variations between contractors and checklists that change from mission to
mission [15]. Under the RSA architecture, STAR will be used at both Vandenberg and
Cape Canaveral [34]. There will still be scheduled maintenance. Automated diagnostics
and larger system pieces are meant to speed up repair. Regular and routine maintenance
will be handled under operations, but repair of individual equipment items will still be
performed by the maintenance squadrons under the logistics organizations [31].
Maintenance downtimes are to have the same priority as a launch [11].
As of right now, these changes to existing launch infrastructure are proposed.
Seventy percent of the RSA IIA program has been officially contracted out. Most of
RSA IIA has been re-scoped to a new contract, the Spacelift Range System Contract
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(SLRSC). The new sustainment contract is to be let in March 2000 after the submission
of this thesis, so it will continue to be referred to as RSA IIA here [27]. There is still
some question as to what the actual modifications are going to be and what the new
processes will look like once RSA is fully implemented. There is particular concern over
how the transition between the current systems and the new architecture will be handled
[15].

4.5 Range Scheduling From a Lean Perspective
We will now examine the process of range scheduling from a lean perspective.
The first step toward making a process "lean" is to define the value stream. This, in turn,
requires determining what is of value. The value of scheduling is for each organization
or group being able to make use of range assets when required.

Obviously, this is not

always possible because another group may want to use the same resources at the same
time, or some uncontrollable situation arises, such as interference in the launch area, bad
weather, or some technical difficulty. At this point, it becomes valuable to be able to
recoordinate schedules quickly to best utilize range resources and supply the user with
the necessary resources.
The value stream in this process, which is essentially service oriented, flows
between the customer and the scheduler in the range squadron. There must be open, twoway communication to establish what requirements are necessary for a mission and
setting up and changing activities on the range.
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When conflicts arise between two

organizations looking to use the same resource or time slot the value stream includes both
parties involved.
In order to provide value to the range users, schedulers must have the ability to
pull and allocate resources from the range. They must know what assets are necessary,
who controls those assets, whether conflicts would arise by obligating those assets to a
user, and who to go to resolve those conflicts.

The schedulers should have that

information at their disposal or be able to obtain it from the organization or person that
does.

It should then be possible to quickly reallocate those resources to the closest

satisfaction of the users involved. It is this rapid reallocation or schedule rearranging that
is the real measure of value in the range scheduling process. In its Range Integrated
Product Team (IPT) report, Air Force Space Command mentions scheduling stabilization
as part of a sensitivity analysis on range capacity. It proposes that a 30% reduction in
schedule changes would result in a 5% increase in capacity [17:26]; however, applying
this reduction would serve to limit customer flexibility and, therefore, customer value.
The goal in improving the range scheduling process should not be to reduce the number
of schedule date changes, but rather to reduce the time it takes to make those changes.

4.6 Are Current Processes and Procedures Lean?
The Lean Enterprise Model (LEM) provides the framework for moving
organizations and processes in the defense aerospace industry toward becoming lean and
consists of twelve key overarching practices. (A copy of the LEM in its graphical form is
included as a fold-out in the appendix to this thesis) Since this is the benchmark used in
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making those processes lean, it is useful to examine some of those practices as they
pertain to range scheduling. Three of the LEM's overarching principles will be examined
along with some of their supporting practices. These three were chosen because they
have the largest number of enabling practices that were easily identifiable and applicable
to scheduling. Descriptions of how each of these practices pertain to range scheduling
activities will be discussed along with current examples of their application in the defense
aerospace industry. This is not to say that the remaining nine principles lack relevance in
the area of range scheduling. Attention is given to them at the end of this chapter.

4.6.1

Identify and Optimize Enterprise Flow
This is the first overarching practice mentioned in the Lean Enterprise Model.

The definition of this practice is to "optimize the flow of products and services either
affecting or within the process, from concept design through point of use [12:9]."

4.6.1.1

Establish Models and/or Simulations
The first enabling practice under identification and optimizations of flow is the

establishment of models and/or simulations to permit understanding and evaluation of the
flow process. There appears to be little or no modeling at present or proposed under the
RSA program to facilitate this. Currently, customers and users are able to view the
schedule and are provided with documentation as to the processes and approvals involved
in scheduling decisions and allocations. Under RSA and the new STAR system the
customer does not have access to the system - only the schedulers have that access. The
range operators and schedulers, and long time customers such as Boeing and Lockheed
Martin seem to have a good understanding of the interrelationships between aspects of
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the range. New customers may find things very confusing. Flow charts and decision
trees are available showing the requirements necessary to launch a payload from a given
range, but the interactions and necessary relationships within that range are not clearly
stated or visible. NASA has told range officials at Cape Canaveral that they would like
to be able to send templates or scenarios to a knowledge engine that can let them know
what can and cannot be done, and, what they must do to obtain range support [29]. There
are no models or simulations in use to evaluate the effectiveness of this entire flow
process.
Pratt & Whitney is currently making progress in this area within the defense
aerospace industry by employing new software for finite capacity planning in its North
Brunswick, Maine facility.

The "Cellular Intelligent Manufacturing Production and

Labor Enterprise Tool" (CIMPLEST) is used to evaluate capacity requirements according
to labor, commodity code, and worker skills. This helps to quickly identify needs for
resource reallocation, as well as calculate takt time [12:10]. This is similar to the resource
allocation and deconfliction that the STAR system is to be used for under RSA.

4.6.1.2 Reduce the Number of Flow Paths
The number of flow paths in the scheduling process is kept to a minimum under
current range structures. This enabling practice is, therefore, fairly well applied. Most of
the scheduling deconfliction and allocation go directly through the scheduling department
for customers and other range users. This should not change as RSA is brought on-line.

4-18

4.6.1.3

Reduce Setup Times
The next enabling practice is reduction of setup times. Actual turnaround time for

pads, equipment, telemetry and other infrastructure at Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg is
between 4 to 24 hours depending on the complexity of the systems being launched [7].
Different sizes of launch vehicles will have different specifications and reconfiguration
times. This all has to be coordinated through scheduling for launches to occur. VAFB
has approximately four tracking radars and a number of surveillance radars for safety
reasons (to cover sea, land, and air space around the launch area). Radars can usually
turn around in minutes to hours.

Telemetry is slower (around 4 hours). In addition to

radar and telemetry reconfiguration, new software and hardware needs to be up loaded.
The consoles used by range operators are old and have links like the old-time operator
switchboards.

These links, too, have to be redirected for each launch because the

contractor(s) specific to each mission will have its own control sites at different parts of
the country, which may require different processors and different links [8].
Despite of the archaic equipment, the setup times are more than adequate for the
demand, with plenty of capacity left over. What becomes a problem is the limit on the
manpower available to perform these changes. With personnel draw downs, the range
currently operates with one crew, and it is necessary for that crew to go on rest after each
launch for a least eight hours because launches themselves last a number of hours. Then
the crew can come back and reconfigure the range for the next launch. After that, another
period of crew rest is necessary before the next launch preparation sequence can begin.
The new "core crew" concept currently under consideration would have a smaller crew
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responsible for the launch and an additional crew which could do the reconfiguration
while the core launch crew is on rest. That way, when they return a new launch sequence
could start immediately [17]. The idea of the "core crew" and its purpose are lean
improvements and are moving in the right direction. It offers a more effective use of
time and manpower.
RSA also provides some relief in this area with the lean application of automation
to the reconfiguration of equipment. A number of key automation initiatives will be
utilized as follows:
•

Automation of the range system initialization process and its inclusion into the
range scheduling system

•

Computer-aided configuration

setup based on execution of predefined

configuration control tables that establish required mission support
•

Implementation of automatic fault detection/isolation

•

Centralized planning and scheduling

•

Automation of operational equipment initialization, configuration control,
calibration, and testing that verifies establishment of a proper range/user mission
support configuration [32:525]
These changes and automated improvements are expected to help the ranges do

more with fewer people. They are a step in the direction of becoming lean, since they
simplify the processes of reconfiguration and scheduling of range assets through the use
of existing technology.
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These improvements and automations should alleviate another impediment to
flow at the ranges - "lockouts." A verification and validation is performed on each
mission. Tests are scheduled 2-3 days before launch or major operation to make sure
everything works. Verifications are then performed the day before. With some large or
complicated vehicles, such as Titan, the launch agency will request the range to be
"locked out" from that point until launch to make sure that nothing gets changed. This
effectively shuts down the range for that period of time [11]. This is a serious impediment
to the flow of the launch process and adds little or no value.
The major reason for the lockouts is that range configuration is a complicated
process and equipment is very touchy.

The user is concerned about breaking the

configuration and having to perform re-verification [11]. This, in turn, could lead to
launch delays.

With the newer, automated equipment to be delivered with the RSA

program, this problem should be alleviated. There will no longer be the need to manually
switch cables, circuits or connections, and the equipment should not be as susceptible to
failure. This increased robustness should eliminate the need to lock out the range.
There has been some concern expressed over the new STAR system for the
automation of schedule allocation and deconfliction.

The ability to reschedule is not

expected to be as flexible with the new system. More steps are needed to do the same
activities and the interface is not as user-friendly. The center where the changes are
being developed is in Houston. There will be no real-time capability to change code in
the software, whereas before, it took only a phone call [34]. With the manual intervention
that is sometimes required in resolving conflicts between organizations looking to use the
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same launch date or resource, there may also be problems with using an automated
conflict resolution system, especially in a service-oriented process such as launch
scheduling [29]. Likely, the biggest advantage of using STAR will be the timely
identification of conflicts, which would facilitate quicker solutions to those conflicts.

4.6.1.4 Maintain Equipment to Minimize Unplanned Stoppages
Another of the key enabling practices in identifying and optimizing enterprise
flow is the proper maintenance of equipment to minimize downtimes and stoppages.
Preventive maintenance of range equipment includes inspection, cleaning, mechanical
adjustments and alignments, electronic/electrical adjustments, etc [31]. Older equipment
requires constant "tweaking" to keep it running. These adjustments have driven the
replacement of older systems with newer equipment possessing better operating
capability and requiring fewer preventive maintenance actions. This will continue to be
the case as more and more RSA systems are brought on-line. Currently, range equipment
has few self-diagnostics and built-in test equipment [31]. This too, will begin to change.
Preventive maintenance is performed by technicians on-site and by operator/maintainers
[31]. These preventive maintenance requirements have decreased as more and more new
equipment is introduced. These practices are similar to lean initiatives being used by
Pratt & Whitney as part of its Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) program. TPM
improves equipment performance and brings operators into the maintenance process.
TPM involves initial cleaning and inspection, daily operator walkarounds and equipment
checks, keeping records of down time, failure history, machine capability, and routine
scheduled maintenance performed by either operators or maintenance personnel [12:19].
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However, routine maintenance actions have been having a smaller and smaller
effect on scheduling at the ranges, with very few occasions occurring where launches
have been scrubbed due to an equipment failure just prior to launch. The main driver for
those few scrubs is the redundancy of systems on the range [31]. Figure 18 shows how
maintenance actions have decreased at Cape Canaveral as newer equipment has been
introduced to the range. Depot-level maintenance (DLM) is where the largest amount of
interaction happens [31].
Depot-level maintenance, for the most part, is a scheduled activity. It involves
both preventive and corrective maintenance that is performed by an agency outside the
range because of special skills, knowledge, or tools required. At Cape Canaveral, DLM
is performed at the range. In the event that it cannot be handled at CCAS, the part must
be handed over to maintenance, which in turn hands it over to another depot, located in
Sacramento or Wright-Patterson AFB, OH [31].
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RSA will not fundamentally change the process of handing off equipment for
major repairs. There will still be scheduled maintenance and all equipment will still fall
primarily under the operations group. If a system has a failure, it will be troubleshooted
by an operator/maintainer and performs necessary on-equipment maintenance activity.
Any reparable part removed as part of these repair is sent to the vendor or depot for
further action.

To do serious repairs, the item will still have to be turned over to

maintenance and so on [31]. In that sense, there still are problems with the process.
Equipment that requires work beyond what can be repaired at the range can pass through
a number of organizations and be taken to other areas of the country. These actions do
not add value and should be looked at even though their occurrences are few.
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RSA does make some strides, however, toward getting equipment repaired more
quickly and back on-line for scheduling and operations. The items are going to be larger
and replacements done on a sub-system level. The use of these larger parts is meant to
speed up the repair process [31].

4.6.2 Assure Seamless Information Flow
Another important practice identified by the LEM is the assurance of seamless
information flow. It is necessary to "provide processes for seamless and timely transfer
of and access to pertinent information [12:21]."
4.6.2.1

Minimize Documentation While Ensuring Data Traceability and Availability
Progress has been made under the current range structure in reducing the approval

times. Informing the various people throughout the wing at Cape Canaveral AS used to
be performed through a staff summary sheet, containing the purpose, background, and
other information regarding the change.

The typical time taken in the process of

contacting all of the people involved was approximately one week. The use of electronic
forms has brought this down to 3 days [29]. It is much easier to receive and pass on
responses from the parties involved using the computer, and the physical hand-off of
paperwork is no longer there.

This is definitely progress toward minimizing

documentation while ensuring necessary data traceability and availability.
An example of a lean practice similar to this being preformed in the defense
aerospace industry is Northrup Grumman's AutoBuy expert system. This system will
automatically create requisitions for all requirements, check residual materials across all
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Northrup Grumman sites, schedule deliveries based on build scheduling, approve
requisitions based on set criteria, and create purchase orders for master agreement parts
[12:28]. The expected benefits are reduced manpower requirements and reduced quote
cycle time to "0" days with minimum documentation [12:28].
Opportunity for application of this enabling practice concerns the forms used by
both ranges in the course of scheduling actions and launches. It was previously noted
that differences in forms continually need be reconciled, even though they contain the
same essential information. There is no value added to the process by continually having
to take the time to resolve these differences. Standardization of the documentation and
forms between Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral could eliminate that particular
impediment to the process flow. RSA Phase IIA does take steps in that direction with its
centralized documentation and database systems for the entire spacelift range structure.

4.6.2.2

Link Databases for Key Functions
Under the new RSA structure, centralized archival of data will be utilized, so that

information will be more easily shared and accessed across the range [32:7].
Additionally, the optimum control and display solution calls for integration of
information across all range functional areas necessary to perform and support the
generation, execution, and recovery of missions [32:13]. STAR will allow the scripts
associated with scheduled range operations to be automatically updated as the need arises
and that information can be retrieved through a metadata search engine [32:15]. These
changes go a long way toward linking databases for key functions throughout the value
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stream. Standard computing environments with proven commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
software are also to be facets of the new system [32:17].
Again, a current industry example of this practice is Northrup Grumman's
Integrated Management Control System in Rolling Meadows, Illinois that incorporates
planning and procurement systems, shop floor control, and quality systems.

Shop

support (engineers, planners, expediters, etc) have been reduced 48% in spite of a three
times increase in shop orders and stock levels [12:26]. Textron Systems in Wilmington,
Massachusetts has also been developing a company-wide database system, with common
software standards to help increase the performance of its existing programs [12:26].

4.6.3 Make Decisions At Lowest Possible Level
This key overarching practice has particular application in scheduling where
approvals are often necessary for changes.

The objective of the lean philosophy is to

"design the organizational structure and management systems to accelerate and enhance
decision making at the point of knowledge, application, and need [12:37]."
Two of the main aspects of this overarching practice are empowering people to
make decisions at the point of work and minimizing hand-offs and approvals (see
Appendix). In the case of scheduling changes, there is a multitude of approving officials
sandwiched between the scheduling department and the ultimate decision making
authority, the wing commander. For initial placement on the schedule there is no long
line of people necessary to sign-off. The scheduler is authorized to handle that.
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Under an Air Force wing structure there are certain protocols and channels that
must be used, so it is not hard to understand where the long list of approving officers
comes from. Partially, there is the desire to limit any frivolous or excess paperwork
ending up on the wing commander's desk. This is understandable. There are also times
when conflicts exist which cannot be resolved satisfactorily by the scheduling
department, and arbitration from a higher authority, such as the wing commander, may be
needed.
From the perspective of lean, however, there is no value added by including many
people in the approval chain for scheduling changes. If the range scheduler is able to
identify and find an acceptable solution to the allocation and deconfliction of range
assets, is it really necessary to involve the entire command authority at the range especially when this authority is not needed for routine additions to the schedule?
The Air Force has recognized that these practices and approving actions are not
benefiting the scheduling process or the cycle-times for launches. In its Range Integrated
Product Team report on range user-friendliness the Air Force stated that "existing wing
processes, used to schedule, reschedule, or cancel launches with the wing-delegated
authority, are too slow." It mentions that the necessary actions can take weeks to become
final even for routine requests [17:9]. Table 2 summarizes some of the enabling practices
and suggested metrics for the LEM principles that have been mentioned in this thesis.
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Table 2

LEM Practices and Metrics for Seamless Information Flow, Optimizing
Enterprise Flow, and Making Decisions at the Lowest Level
Enabling Practices

•

Broaden jobs to facilitate the
development of a flexible
workforce

•

•

Build stable and cooperative
relationships internally and
externally
Provide for continuous
information flow and feedback
with stakeholders

•

Assure consistency of enterprise
strategy with "lean" principles
and practices

•

•

•

•

•

•

Provide for an interchange of
knowledge from and within the
supplier network

•

•

•

Define and control processes
throughout the value chain

•

•

Level demand to enable
continuous flow

•

•

Minimize cycle-time to limit
susceptibility to externally
imposed changes
Structure programs to absorb
changes with minimal impact

•

•

Suggested Metrics

Suggested
Supporting Practices

•

Broaden jobs of range operators
and other workers to include the
ability to perform routine
maintenance and turn around
(this is currently being done)
Focus on relationships not only
with well established customers,
but also first-time customers
Provide for continuous
information flow and feedback
between scheduling, customer,
range organizations, and range
command authority
Assure scheduling strategy is
consistent with lean principles
and practices
Assure range strategy is
consistent with lean principles
and practices
Provide for an interchange of
knowledge between scheduling,
customers, and range
organizations
Provide a common location for
stakeholders to access
information (already being done
and is planned for under RSA)
Define and control processes
involved in range scheduling

•
•

Output/employee
Certifications/qualifications per
employee

•
•

# of new customers
# of years relationship with
customers
Time for information retrieval
Stakeholder access to range
information

Level launch demand and need
for scheduling actions to enable
continuous flow
Minimize times required to
perform scheduling changes and
deconflict range assets
Structure range scheduling
change and deconfliction
mechanism to min. capacity loss

•

•
•

•
•

Lean metrics in scheduling
Lean metrics within the range

•
•
•

Information database
Use of "lessons learned" system
Provision of training programs
for new and existing customers

•
•

Software productivity
Employ lean practices in
scheduling
Launches/time period

•

Time required to make changes
to schedule or deconflict assets

•
•

# of scheduling restructures
Impact of changes on future
launch dates

While these metrics cover, for the most part, the LEM practices of making
decisions at the lowest level, assuring seamless information flow, and making decisions
at the lowest level, there are certainly other aspects of the LEM that can be applied to
range scheduling. Table 3 examines some of them.

4-29

Table 3
Enabling Practices

Other LEM Practices and Metrics

Establish models and/or
simulations to permit
understanding and evaluation of
the flow process

•

•

Reduce number of flow paths

•

•

Reduce setup times

•
•

•

•

•
•

Develop templates and scenario
generation for launch scheduling
and resource allocation
Allow customers continuous
access to scheduling system
Reduce the number of personal
contacts necessary for the
customer to get scheduling
information and request changes
Reduce range setup times
Reduce range reconfiguration
times
Eliminate range "lockouts"
Reduce deconfliction times

•
•

Model/simulation software
Online/available scheduling
information

•

# of people stakeholder must
contact to get
information/request changes

•
•

•

Setup time, reconfiguration time
Automation of range
configuration
Manpower usage
# of range "lockouts"
time from identification to
deconfliction/resolution
Lost capacity due to unplanned
depot level maintenance
# of maintenance actions
Use of electronic
communication and
documentation
Rework time for documentation
conflicts
# of approving officials for
scheduling actions
stakeholder access to necessary
information

•

Maintain equipment to minimize
unplanned stoppages

•

Maintain range equipment to
minimize unplanned stoppages

•

Minimize documentation while
ensuring necessary data
traceability and availability

•

Minimize paperwork necessary
for scheduling changes
Automate form generation
Standardize paperwork for
scheduling
Delegate approval authority for
routine scheduling changes
Allow stakeholders access to
scheduling information and data
archival
Minimize hand-offs for
scheduling actions
Allow scheduling authority to
deconflict problems

•

•

Suggested Metrics

Suggested
Supporting Practices

•
•

Delegate or share responsibility
for decisions throughout the
value chain

•

Minimize hand-offs and
approvals within and between
line and support activities

•

•

•
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•
•
•

•
•

•
•
•

•
•

# of hand-off required for
authorization
# of organizational levels

5

Recommendations

The voice of great events is proclaiming to us, Reform, that you
may preserve.
Thomas Babington Macaulay
As evidenced in the previous chapter, there are a number of potential areas for the
application of lean throughout the range scheduling process. The question now arises as
to what should be changed or left the same in order for scheduling to become more lean
and move toward perfection.

5.1 Organizational Structure
Operational problems, for the most part, are caused by the inherent organizational
structure of the range system, and this is difficult to change. The typical Air Force wing
structure is a vertical organization with a strict hierarchy.

This is the nature of the

military organization. With this structure come additional layers of management that can
slow decision-making at times [10:76]. Downsizing in the military has not changed the
fundamental way that the ranges do business in spite of the increased productivity
required from remaining resources.
There are a number of commercial organizations that are looking to "flatten" their
management structures. Not only does this have the intention of improving speed and
efficiency (by reducing the need for managing relations between departments and
relaying information up and down the hierarchy), it focuses more of the company's
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resources on the customer [10:77]. Ryder System, for example, had been organized as a
vertical organization with divisions based on a specific product. The company wanted to
organize itself in such a way that it could reduce overhead and improve its ability to
respond to customer needs.

At the time, to purchase a vehicle for leasing, it was

sometimes necessary for 14 to 17 document handoffs from one functional department at
one level of management to another. Ryder began viewing this paperwork flow as a
single process starting with the actual purchase of a vehicle and ending with renting it to
the customer.

By eliminating unnecessary approvals, and moving authority to lower

levels of the organization, Ryder was able to cut handoffs from five to two and reduce its
purchasing cycle by one-third [10:79].
Other major corporations have also been making the move toward "flattening"
their organizations in order to improve operations. General Electric's lighting division
has eliminated its previous vertical management structure in favor of a horizontal design
with over 100 processes and programs [10:78]. Their attempt to develop a
"boundaryless"
responsiveness.

company has

reduced

cycle

times

and

costs

and

increased

Eastman Chemical, a division of Kodak eliminated senior vice-

presidents for administration, manufacturing, and research and development and replaced
them with self-directed teams.

Lexmark International also moved toward cross-

functional teams and reduced 60% of its managers in manufacturing and support [10:79].
The wing organization at each range should conduct a value stream analysis of its
schedule modification approval process.

It should be determined which approving

officials actually add value. After this is performed, consideration should be given to
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approvals that can occur in parallel rather than in a series. It may also be possible that
there could be a routing of necessary approvals to various officials on a case-by-case
basis.

5.2 Automation
The Range Standardization and Automation Program provides an excellent
framework for incorporating new technologies and automation to make information
transfer, archival, and generation easier. This is necessary for becoming lean and for
competing with newer launch ranges. Even though current, aging systems continue to
provide adequate support for launches, they are gradually becoming increasingly problem
prone and unresponsive. If demand continues to increase in the space launch industry, it
is likely that users will go elsewhere to get the support and services they need. RSA is an
essential upgrade and restructuring for the Spacelift Range System.

5.2.1

Information Management & Communications
Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg should use these technological upgrades, such as

fiber optics, communications, computer, and data retrieval technologies, to make the
launch process as easy and expedient as possible for the customer.

Enabling the

customers to have timely access to as much information as possible, should be a central
focus. The concern should not be simply with the range functional areas. As previously
mentioned, RSA does not give customers access to the system. It will be more beneficial
to the customers to have the future systems web-based. This is an excellent place to start
improvements. Continuous information flow and feedback with the customer regarding
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requirements generation, product development and solution-based problem solving is a
must within a lean enterprise and new technologies are providing innumerable avenues to
exploit this. Every possible effort should be taken in order to do so. The Internet, e-mail,
and high-speed computer networking, for example, can provide almost instantaneous
feedback and information transfer.

5.2.2 Equipment Reconfiguration
Range lockouts must be eliminated. They stick out prominently as muda and are
a serious roadblock to the launch flow process. Because of this, it becomes a problem for
scheduling of range assets. Unavailability of some communications, instrumentation or
other equipment even when they are not being used is unacceptable. The RSA program
should alleviate this with its improvements and upgrades to infrastructure. Equipment
should be easier to reconfigure, it should be less "touchy" and more responsive. These
enhancements must be exploited to eliminate unnecessary downtime to range assets and
impediments to process flow.

Activities that can be automated, such as radar and

telemetry reconfiguration, must be automated in order to make them as lean as possible.
The ability to remotely or electronically configure assets on the range is a significant
"lean" advantage since it uses existing technology to reduce the times necessary to
complete such activities. Additionally, the chances of errors in the configurations will be
reduced. RSA can and should eliminate the need for lockouts.

5.2.3 Maintenance
Routine maintenance is continuing to improve, mostly because of new equipment
being incorporated into the range. This new equipment will not require the adjustment
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that older equipment does, such as the switchboard style connections for older operator
consoles.

While replacing out-of-date systems is certainly a good thing, it is not a

permanent fix. Eventually, even these new systems will become less robust to work with.
It is important to make sure that the leanest system possible is in place for depot-level
maintenance, whether it be programmed or due to equipment failure. The latter type of
maintenance has the greatest effect on scheduling and range downtime.

The new

infrastructure under RSA is to have larger equipment items and, therefore, make
replacement and diagnostics easier. The ability to perform depot-level maintenance at
the range itself is "lean", since distances and times for transfers of equipment are
minimized as opposed to having to send the part to another portion of the country.
Multiple transfers and off-site DLM can occur, however and this should be examined as
part of the maintenance value-stream. The use of larger equipment pieces is an also an
excellent idea and should be continued as planned. The process involved in depot-level
maintenance should be examined to determine the entire value stream. Once this is done,
changes can be made to eliminate impediments to flow.

As more areas of range

operations become lean, and turnaround times and launch rates improve, a continuously
operating range becomes even more critical.
Using operators as maintainers is another excellent lean tactic. The efficient use
of manpower is a principle of lean thinking.

Training operators to provide routine

maintenance on equipment provides for this and is a practice that should be continued.
Remote maintenance and self-diagnostics on range equipment will also save man-hours.
This, too, should be considered when implementing automation in the new Spacelift
Range System and made a part of any future launch infrastructure.
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5.2.4 Automated Scheduling Systems
From the lean perspective, the STAR automated improvement makes sense.
Recognizing conflicts automatically and providing possible solutions saves time and
effort on the part of the schedulers and makes use of existing technology to improve flow.
However, there are some aspects of STAR that might not improve the process. The
system interfaces are not as friendly as before and the actual schedulers who would be
using STAR were not consulted regarding the type of user interfaces that would make
their job easier and provide them with the most value [34]. The ability to make real-time
changes to the source code will also be missing, when previous types activities only
required a phone call [34]. Conflict resolution between companies and organizations
involving launch dates often requires face-to-face or other direct human intervention.
Identification of these conflicts as early as possible can reduce subsequent problems in
the scheduling process, and the STAR system is supposed to do that very well; however,
deconfliction of range assets may not be the best candidate for automation. Automatic
deconfliction can lead to more work for the schedulers to undo. This is part of the
scheduling process may best be left to human intervention.
STAR is an excellent improvement and should be implemented, provided it is
used primarily for identifying scheduling conflicts or fixing minor problems. Larger
conflicts such as schedule date changes should not be automated. It is not necessary or
desirable to have full automation, but partial automation is a definite improvement.
There also needs to be the ability to make real-time changes to the source code in the
STAR software. This is a capability that is not there. The addition of scenario generation
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software is an additional lean improvement to scheduling and should be a priority to
enable more expedient deconfliction of range assets.

5.3 Integrated Product and Process Teams
Another important facet of lean is the use of integrated product and process teams.
The use of these types of teams is not exploited in the scheduling process. Instead of
allowing an adversarial relationship to develop between maintenance, operations, and
even between contractors, teams could be used to help range schedulers allocate range
assets. Not only would this facilitate more expedient resolution of conflicts, but it would
provide more visibility to the entire scheduling operation to the stakeholders. IPPTs
should be implemented in range scheduling operations.

5.4 Primary Value
Overall, the most important metric of the U.S. launch range scheduling process is
the time it takes to recognize and resolve changes and conflicts. Changes to the range
schedule and allocation of assets are inevitable. Trying to eliminate or limit the number
alterations does not provide value to the range customer or user, especially with the
complexity of the launch vehicles, payloads and infrastructures. The ability to quickly
react to and implement these adjustments will be of the most value to the range and its
customers. This is what range scheduling and the range itself needs to be striving for,
and this involves open communications for all stakeholders and user access to necessary
information. This needs to be a top priority.
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5.5 Additional Topics For Study
In addition to range scheduling, there are a multitude of activities at the range and
regarding range operations that lend themselves to lean examination.
1) Planning. Planning involves the coordination of range assets throughout the
entire time the launch vehicle or payload is at the range. As mentioned before, prior to
the move from Air Force Systems Command to Air Force Materiel Command and AF
Space Command, the range had engineering, acquisition, and development as well as
operations under its direction.

After the split, the engineering, acquisition and

development were placed under AFMC and the operation of the ranges was given to AF
Space Command.

Whereas the wing commander used to have operations and

engineering working directly for him, they are now in different commands. If the range
has a deficiency or can't provide some sort of support to the user, a deficiency statement
must be written. It then has to be approved locally and at AFSPC even though the user
might be the one paying for it.

Once this is approved, an engineering statement is

developed for AFMC who comes back with an estimate and requests the money.
Logistics deals with the deficiency statements, so the range does not interact directly with
AF Materiel Command. It is necessary for the range to go through maintenance. The
range is no longer a whole entity and once again, there may be "stovepiping."
Another issue regarding turn around times is the OD. Because each mission and
vehicle has unique requirements Directives can very greatly between successive
launches. It takes time for the range operators to go over this document and become
familiar with it so that they can control the launch. This can involve anywhere from one
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to two weeks and possibly affect cycle times. The use of a standard launch vehicle, such
as the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) may make strides toward improving
this situation.
It may also be useful to examine the process involved in the interaction between
the contractors and the wing or range when it comes to the planning of various missions,
from the time the customer comes to wing plans with a requirement or need to the
generation of the Operations Directive. How many different people does the customer
have to contact over the course of the vehicle or mission lead-time, which can be around
3 years? This number should be minimized. How do changes in mission requirements
affect lead times, especially with regard to documentation?

A "one-stop shop" has

recently been attempted at Cape Canaveral where the customer only needs to deal with a
single person at the wing plans department to take care of questions and other needs.
This is a significant "lean" improvement. The use of Integrated Product and Process
Teams (IPPTs) could provide additional value to the customer and improve the process.
2) Training.
range time.

Currently, most training for range operations requires dedicated

Vandenberg did recently install a training consol of its Range Control

Officers and Range Operations Controllers that would not require shutting down the
range. Also, there is the issue of how training will work between the two ranges as the
equipment becomes standardized with the full implementation of RSA.
3) Manpower Usage. With personnel draw downs, the range currently operates
with one crew and it's necessary for that crew to go on rest after each launch for a least
eight hours because launches themselves last a number of hours. Then the crew can
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come back and reconfigure the range for the next launch. After that another period of
crew rest is necessary before the next launch is able to start. The new "core crew"
concept currently under consideration would have a smaller crew responsible for the
launch and an additional crew which could do the reconfiguration while that core crew is
on rest. That way, when they come back and a new launch could start immediately.
There is also the idea of having a maintenance crew that works maintenance most of the
time, but could become operators during launch time. It would be useful to determine the
use of launch personnel that adds the most value to the launch process.
4) Maintenance and Safety. Maintenance and safety procedures could be more
closely examined to see where lean applies along with any increases inflexibility as a
result of new communications, telemetry, tracking and control infrastructure.
5) Launch on Demand. There can often be long call-up times for replacement
satellites. The launches of some of these satellites can be scheduled years in advance and
may not be needed when they are launched. This can affect scheduling and cause pad
crowding [43]. There may be a need to examine if these actions are lean. Also, the valuestream for the scheduling process may change should launch on demand become a
reality.
6) Schedule Modeling and Scenario Generation. As mentioned in the previous
chapter, a key enabling practice for the identification and optimization of enterprise flow
is the use of models and simulations to evaluate flow. This is a key area for making lean
improvements in scheduling operations.

More research could be performed into

developing scheduling flow models and scenario generators. It would be necessary to
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determine what characteristics should be used and what information should be included
to model the processes effectively.
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6

Conclusions

/ have but one lamp by which my feet are guided; and that is the
lamp of experience. I know of no way of judging the future but by the past.
Patrick Henry
It is apparent that existing launch facilities in the U.S. with their aging
infrastructure do not have the flexibility or cost effectiveness to remain competitive on
into the future. Even if the competition among launch sites does not have an effect on the
U.S. presence in the space launch industry, the enormous price per pound to get to space
will still be an issue that must be dealt with. This is in addition to the desire for launch
on demand capability.

The Range Standardization and Automation Program is a

necessity in this respect. But, even technology has its limits and obtaining perfection will
require examining all of the processes and players involved in space launch.
This thesis examined the process of space range scheduling. It concluded that
lean principles can be applied in the allocation and deconfliction of range assets, as well
as the schedule change approval process.

The Lean Enterprise Model's overarching

practices of identifying and optimizing enterprise flow, assuring seamless information
flow, and making decisions at the lowest possible level have particular importance. All
of the LEM's practices, however, have some relevance in scheduling activities.
It was determined that there were many aspects of current range scheduling
practices and upgrades to be made as part of the Range Standardization and Automation
Program that would be considered "value-added" and not impede flow under the
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principles and philosophies of lean. Some of these were the use of electronic notification
for range schedule change requests, improving the robustness of range infrastructure,
allowing users easier access to scheduling information and databases, and automating the
reconfiguration of range assets. These actions should be continued and improved upon.
There were other areas identified that did not follow the principles of the lean
philosophy and they should be more closely examined to identify their value streams and
value-added steps. Organizational and schedule approving structures was one such area.
Avoiding excessive automation in range deconfliction, eliminating range "lockouts," and
implementing integrated product and process teams were a few others. The ultimate goal
of any "lean" endeavor into the scheduling process would be to reduce the time necessary
to perform scheduling changes and adjustments while providing the greatest satisfaction
to the stakeholders involved at the optimum cost.
With the potential applications of lean in space range scheduling identified, the
question remained as to the potential impact of making those applications. Since specific
benefits in time, money, and effort through the implementation of lean are difficult to
quantify specifically because of the differences in situations, it was necessary to discuss
examples of programs implemented in the defense aerospace industry that correlated with
lean principles.

In these examples, lean had a significant positive impact.

By

comparison, one would expect similar advantages to appear in range scheduling.
Even though there appears to be definite benefits through applying lean practices
to range scheduling and operations, if you were to ask if the application of lean to the
areas mentioned would be a driving force in reducing cycle times and cost in the launch
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process the answer would most likely be no. The majority of the cycle time is spent
preparing the space vehicles and payloads for launch and very seldom are there delays
due to range equipment failures. With launch cycles of anywhere from 25 days to a year
and a half, a significant drop in range reconfiguration times, which are around 24 hours at
Vandenberg, would not make a significant impact. There could, however, be a positive
impact on range capacity as scheduling flexibility increases. It is also a good idea to
investigate the range operations processes though, because cycle times will continue to
decrease as lean is applied to launch vehicle preparation. As these cycle times drop,
range reconfiguration and maintenance will become more and more influential. The
earlier this is examined the better. That way the ranges will be prepared not to have to
spend more time, money, or research later on or sub-optimize the launch process.
There is one additional concern, and that is over the implementation of lean
changes within range scheduling - there could be difficulties in making them a reality.
The problem that can arise is that the book answer may be this, but what's the operational
answer? This is a question that deals not only with lean leadership, but also the nature of
the military and its necessary organizational structure.
There has been a definite push toward lean in the defense aerospace industry since
the inception of Lean Aerospace Initiative in 1992. In space, its presence is now being
felt in the areas of spacecraft and payload testing and manufacturing. Its new push is
toward range operations, whether it be on-orbit, launch, or pre-launch. The inclusion of
these areas makes sense since lean thinking seeks to include the entire launch enterprise.
Efforts to improve access to space and make it more affordable will continue to be an
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important part of the launch industry not just for the United States, but for the entire
world as well, with its increasing dependency on satellites for communications and
information. It appears that "lean" will persist in its efforts to place itself at the forefront
of those improvements. With continued success in these endeavors, the goals of better,
faster, cheaper may eventually be within reach.
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Appendix: The Lean Enterprise Model
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